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Abstract
In an earlier study we examined the available evidence on the Edelman Prize finalist applications 1989-1998.
This study concluded that 13 of the 42 private sector applications provide examples of strategic operations
research (SOR) when SOR is defined as operations research that creates a sustainable competitive advantage.
In a follow-up study we tested our classifications, gathering longitudinal information on the continued success
of the Edelman applications. We contacted people who were familiar with all the private sector applications
that were Edelman finalists 1989-1996 and had at least five years of history since the competition. We describe
the post-Edelman history of these applications and use this data to reassess their strategic role. We found that
the longitudinal data provides evidence to support our original classification, but also suggests that several
additional applications were more strategic than was originally apparent. We conclude that almost 60% (20 of
34) of these applications created a sustainable competitive advantage for their firms and provide examples of
SOR.
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O R  C H R O N I C L E
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND THE EDELMAN PRIZE
FINALIST APPLICATIONS 1989–1998
PETER C. BELL, CHRIS K. ANDERSON, and STEPHEN P. KAISER
Richard Ivey School of Business, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 3K7
pbell@ivey.ca • canderson@ivey.ca • skaiser@innovative.analytix.com
In an earlier study we examined the available evidence on the Edelman Prize ﬁnalist applications 1989–1998. This study concluded that 13
of the 42 private sector applications provide examples of strategic operations research (SOR) when SOR is deﬁned as operations research
that creates a sustainable competitive advantage. In a follow-up study we tested our classiﬁcations, gathering longitudinal information on
the continued success of the Edelman applications. We contacted people who were familiar with all the private sector applications that
were Edelman ﬁnalists 1989–1996 and had at least ﬁve years of history since the competition. We describe the post-Edelman history of
these applications and use this data to reassess their strategic role. We found that the longitudinal data provides evidence to support our
original classiﬁcation, but also suggests that several additional applications were more strategic than was originally apparent. We conclude
that almost 60% (20 of 34) of these applications created a sustainable competitive advantage for their ﬁrms and provide examples of SOR.
Received August 2001; revision received February 2002; accepted February 2002.
Subject classiﬁcations: Organizational studies, strategy: sustaining a competitive advantage through operations research.
Area of review: OR Chronicle.
The primary impact of a successful business strategyis that it creates a competitive advantage that is sus-
tainable over a period of time, leading Bell (1998) to
deﬁne “strategic OR” (SOR) as . . . operations research that
achieves a sustainable competitive advantage.
While it is generally accepted that OR work can cre-
ate an advantage, it is not nearly so clear that any advan-
tage created can be sustained over a considerable period
of time. We (Bell and Anderson 2002) therefore examined
the private sector Edelman ﬁnalist applications 1989–1998
(published in Interfaces, 1990–1999) to assess whether the
Interfaces article and presentation describing these major
applications provided evidence to support the existence of
SOR. We were looking for evidence that organizations used
OR in a way that provided a distinct advantage over their
competition, sustained over a period of time.
In this article, we ﬁrst summarize our initial assessment
of the strategic importance of the 43 private sector Edel-
man ﬁnalists between 1989 and 1998. The initial study had
two shortcomings: First, the documentation from the Edel-
man competition (articles in Interfaces, plus videotapes of
the ﬁnal presentations) often did not provide the neces-
sary detail to make an informed assessment of the strate-
gic importance of the work. Second, the Edelman compe-
tition provided data at a point in time, and the importance
of an application may only become apparent over a longer
period.
We therefore describe a follow-up study in which we col-
lected longitudinal data on all the private sector Edelman
ﬁnalists published in Interfaces between 1990 and 1997.
We summarize the post-Edelman history of these 34 appli-
cations and use the data collected in the follow-up study to
reevaluate the strategic importance of these applications.
THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EDELMAN
FINALIST APPLICATIONS 1989–1998
The ﬁrst group of applications (SOR in Table 1) pro-
vided the strongest evidence that the work met a deﬁni-
tion of SOR based on the creation of a sustainable com-
petitive advantage. AT&T (Spencer at al. 1990, Brigandi
et al. 1994), American (Anbil et al. 1991, Smith at al.
1992, Vasquez-Marquez 1991) and Delta Air Lines (Sub-
ramanian et al. 1994), Harris Corporation (Leachman et al.
1996), National Car Rental (Geraghty and Johnson 1997),
Sadia (Taube-Netto 1996), Sears (Weigel and Cao 1999),
and Southern Company (Erwin et al. 1991) all used OR
to tackle very complex operations problems over a period
of time, with each new development adding to the sus-
tainability of the advantage created. ABB Electric (Gensch
et al. 1990) and Vilpac Truck Company (Nuno et al. 1993)
used OR to assist or lead major organizational change that
would be costly for competitors to replicate quickly. In two
cases (Sadia and Southern Company) OR was being used
to provide a basic philosophy for overall management of
the entire operation and provide its host organizations with
substantial and apparently sustainable results.
The second group of applications (Contributors in
Table 1) were judged to have created an advantage sus-
tained over a period of time, but this advantage appeared to
be the result of many factors, with the OR work playing a
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Table 1. The 42 private sector Edelman ﬁnalist applications from 1989–1998 grouped according to our initial assessment.
SOR Contributors Insufﬁcient Impact Nonsustainers
ABB Electric
American Airlines
yield management
arrival allocation and
TRIP
AT&T—call simulator
AT&T—telemarketing
site selection
Delta Air Lines
Harris Corporation
National Car Rental
Sadia
*Sears
Southern Company
Vilpac Truck
(13)
Gas Research Institute
KeyCorp
Procter & Gamble
Sainsbury
(4)
AT&T Capital
Bellcore; SONET,
PDSS and R&D
DEC
GE Capital
GTE
IBM; LMS and Optimizer
Kodak
*Nortel
NYNEX
Prudential Securities
*PG&E
Reynolds
Yasuda
(16)
*Cerestar
*Grantham,
Mayo, Van Otterloo
and Company
*Hewlett-Packard
L.L. Bean
Merit Brass
*PALCO
*Taco Bell
Tata Steel
Yellow Freight Systems
(9)
Those marked with * were ﬁnalists in 1997 or 1998 and were not included in the follow-up study.
relatively minor role. At the Gas Research Institute (Burnett
et al. 1993), OR helped managers choose R&D projects, but
the principal beneﬁts accrue from the projects themselves.
At KeyCorp (Kotha et al. 1996), OR supported a compet-
itive strategy based on superior customer service, but the
service strategy itself looks to be the real advantage, while
OR was one contributor to a major restructuring at Procter
and Gamble (Camm et al. 1997), and Sainsbury (Ormerod
1996) used OR to help management decide which systems
to implement, but the major advantage appears to come
from the systems chosen for implementation.
The Edelman documentation for the third group of appli-
cations (Insufﬁcent Impact in Table 1) does not support a
view that these applications created a sustainable advantage
because the ﬁnancial beneﬁts were dwarfed by the scale of
the host corporation or were not provided.
Finally, the fourth group of applications (Nonsustainers
in Table 1) reported signiﬁcant beneﬁts, but the nature of
the company or the OR work suggested to us that any
advantage created was unlikely to be sustainable. For these
companies, the OR work appears to be relatively standard
and/or the problems appear to be routine. There appears to
be nothing to prevent competitors from replicating the work
quickly and nullifying any advantage gained from the OR.
The 43rd application, the Columbus-America Discovery
Group (Stone 1992), was unclassiﬁed. Here OR was used to
locate a sunken treasure ship. Ownership of the wreck was
a signiﬁcant one-time competitive beneﬁt to the client that
was “sustained” through property rights legislation, while
the OR methodology used to deﬁne the search became a
“strategic asset” that was used by the provider as the basis
of a new business. This application illustrates two ways that
OR work might be considered to be “strategic,” but since
neither involves a sustainable competitive advantage for a
client organization, this project was excluded from further
study.
THE NEXT STEP: FOLLOWING UP ON THE
EDELMAN FINALIST APPLICATIONS
As a follow-up on our earlier study, we set out to investi-
gate whether the history of the Edelman ﬁnalist applications
following the competition supported our original classiﬁ-
cation of these OR works and, in particular, whether those
applications that we had classiﬁed as examples of SOR had
lived up to this designation in the years after the work was
made public. We selected the private sector Edelman ﬁnal-
ist applications published in Interfaces between 1990 and
1997. We chose 1997 as the cutoff because these applica-
tions were presented in the spring of 1996, providing at
least ﬁve years of post-Edelman history.
Thirty-four applications from 28 corporations were
1990–1997 Edelman ﬁnalists. Semistructured telephone
interviews were conducted with representatives familiar
with every application. Starting with the authors of the
Interfaces article, we followed a “trail” to determine those
who were working in the company today and were famil-
iar with the application or its fate. We spoke with four or
ﬁve people familiar with some applications, and in other
cases we spoke to several people (who we think should
have known) but could ﬁnd no sign of the application. We
asked open-ended questions to document the history and
current state of the Edelman application, and asked about
managerial interest in OR, competitor response to the Edel-
man work, and the extent to which OR had evolved at these
organizations. The interviews were taped and transcribed,
and most were between 30 and 45 minutes in duration.
OPERATIONS RESEARCH AS A SOURCE OF
SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGE
Our major hypothesis is that ﬁrms can and do use OR to
create a sustainable competitive advantage. We ﬁrst sought
to conﬁrm that the longitudinal evidence, from the 5–10
years after the Edelman prize competition, supported our
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earlier classiﬁcation of 12 applications as examples of
SOR.
The second set of research hypotheses relate to the “con-
tributors,” “insufﬁcient impact,” and “nonsustainer” groups.
Our assessment of these applications was based on the
limited evidence contained in the original publication, but
would further data collection, including the passage of time,
move some of these applications into the SOR group?
In our data collection, we attempted to assess whether
the OR work had had a strategic impact using three inter-
pretations of a strategic impact.
For the ﬁrst group of ﬁrms, it was possible to identify
the speciﬁc problem or issue where the OR work provided
a source of competitive advantage. There was evidence that
this “SOR work” produced a signiﬁcant cost or revenue
impact, that senior management of the client organization
has recognized this, and that the impact was sustained for
some time. “SOR work” generally involves large complex
operations-level problems that are tackled using OR over
an extended period of time. The strongest evidence of the
strategic value of such OR work is clear evidence that the
OR methods, systems, and databases have been developed
and improved upon over a considerable period of time, the
client ﬁrm underwent organizational change to support the
results of the OR work, and that competitors were aware
of and responded to the success of the work (Bell 1998).
A second group of ﬁrms had “SOR Groups.” The
archetype of the SOR group is the OR group at Federal
Express (FedEx).
OR has been thoroughly ingrained in FedEx activities
since start-up in 1973. The FedEx multi-hub distribution
system was designed by the OR group, and its operation
and expansion over the years has been managed with the
extensive use of OR. OR at FedEx appears to be involved
in almost every major decision the corporation takes—
and it has been in this position since the very beginnings
in 1973 (Bell 1998, p. 390, citing Mason et al. 1996).
Frederick W. Smith, Chairman, CEO, and founder of
FedEx has said:
Employing OR techniques and modeling skills, the OR
department has played a role in the development of
long-range plans for the past 17 years and was instru-
mental in determining the speciﬁc growth sequence that
allowed FedEx to become the world’s largest and most
reliable air express carrier. Every major system change
   (was) modeled by OR several years in advance of
the actual system change. This enabled the company
to grow smoothly. . . . By modeling various alternatives
for future system design, FedEx has, in effect, made its
mistakes on paper” (Horner 1991).
We therefore looked for evidence that the OR group had
garnered additional resources and additional projects, and
perhaps even become a part of the corporate culture.
The third group of ﬁrms applied OR tools and techniques
to strategic-level problems or the analysis of “policy prob-
lems.” While this represents a common understanding of
“strategic OR” (see, for example, Dyson 2000), it is usu-
ally very difﬁcult to determine whether these ﬁrms achieved
a sustainable advantage as a result of the OR work. The
decision(s) that was implemented may have resulted in an
advantage, even a sustained one, but since it is usually
impossible to tell what decision the ﬁrm would have imple-
mented if it were not for the OR work, it is problematic to
assess the value of the OR work. We therefore categorized
these ﬁrms as “OR contributors” and suggest that most of
any advantage gained for these ﬁrms is attributable to the
resulting strategic decision, with OR playing a relatively
minor contributing role.
THE 12 “SOR” APPLICATIONS
The interview evidence on the 12 applications we originally
classiﬁed as examples of SOR is summarized in Table 2.
American Airlines (Yield Management, Crew
Pairing, and Arrival-Slot Allocation)
American Airlines Decision Technologies was renamed as
Sabre Decision Technologies and then was spun out of
American Airlines (AA) as a separate company (The Sabre
Group), but retains AA as a client that they support on tech-
nical and business levels. Sabre’s business has grown sub-
stantially in the last few years, and they now work for many
airlines: AA now accounts for only about 20% of their busi-
ness. The next generation yield management system has
been implemented, and has been far advanced compared to
what was in the Edelman paper and has been implemented
by two or three other airlines. The crew-pairing initiative
(TRIP) has moved ahead with some advances in terms of
efﬁciency, especially with technical help from researchers
at Georgia Tech. The arrival-slot allocation system has not
moved ahead very much.
The OR staff working on the yield management and
crew-pairing initiatives has increased slightly since the time
of the articles. Barry Smith, coauthor of the 1991 Edelman-
prize-winning “yield management” article is now chief sci-
entist for Sabre.
Yield management at AA/Sabre continues to provide the
strongest evidence that OR can be “strategic.” This appli-
cation was created out of the competitive necessity for AA
to ﬁnd a competitive response to the rapid rise of dis-
count carriers, such as People Express (PE), following air-
line deregulation in 1979. AA yield management gained
almost instant senior management recognition by address-
ing this crisis, in part by driving PE out of business in
a very short time. Donald Burr, founder and CEO of PE,
“believes that major carrier’s use of sophisticated computer
programs to immediately match or undercut his prices ulti-
mately killed People Express” (Bryan 1989). Commentaries
on the Harvard Business School PE case series conclude:
“The major carriers met People Express’ pricing structure
   and used their reservations systems to achieve optimal
pricing and yield management. PE’s performance, in essen-
tially all dimensions, immediately declined.   The end was
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Table 2. Summarized ﬁndings for the “SOR” applications.
OR Has Additional
Improvements Evidence of Other OR Work Become Part Resources
Period on Initial Organizational Competitive As a Result of of Company Devoted to
Application in Use Work Change Response Implementation Culture OR
AT&T—Telemarketing 1987–  
AT&T—Call simulator 1978–1998    
ABB/Waukesha 1976–      
AA—Yield management 1985–      
AA—ASAS 1989–??  
AA—TRIP 1971–     
Delta 1991–      
Harris Corporation 1992–    
National Car Rental 1994–      
Sadia 1989–   
Southern 1981–      
Vilpac Truck 1988–1993  
swift” (Loveman and Beer 1991a, p. 4), and “It is worth
emphasizing that a reservations system, with its yield man-
agement capacity, is arguably the single most important
strategic asset of an airline” (Loveman and Beer 1991b,
p. 4).
The ﬁnancial impact of yield management to AA has
grown dramatically as the methods and algorithms were
further developed over a six-year period. In 1992, R. L.
Crandall, chairman and CEO of AMR (the parent company
of American Airlines) estimated that “yield management
has generated $1.4 billion in incremental revenue in the last
three years” (Smith et al. 1992, p. 31). By 1998, Tom Cook,
president of SABRE Decision Technologies, had increased
the estimated impact to “almost $1 billion in annual incre-
mental revenue” (Cook 1998, p. 29).
Senior management at AA was aware of the strategic
importance of yield management and supported its contin-
ued development. Crandall stated “I believe that yield man-
agement is the single most important technical development
in transportation management since we entered the era of
airline deregulation in 1979” (Smith et al. 1992, p. 31).
Finally, there has been a clear competitive response.
Almost every major airline has adopted yield management,
and suppliers such as PROS Revenue Management operate
very successfully as providers of yield management soft-
ware and systems to the airline industry.
Crew pairing has followed a similar, although lower-
proﬁle, path. Crew-pairing algorithms have become a com-
petitive necessity in the airline business, and suppliers such
as AD OPT Technologies and Sabre now provide crew-
pairing systems for those airlines that prefer to outsource
rather than develop their own algorithms.
While the recent evidence supports the view that AA
yield management and AA crew pairing created a competi-
tive advantage for AA for at least a 10-period, the evidence
on the strategic impact of arrival-slot allocation is not as
strong. Signiﬁcantly, Sabre still markets SABRE SlotMan-
ager, a slot-managing and tracking system, but arrival-slot
allocation does not appear to be as large or as difﬁcult a
problem as yield management or crew pairing, or to have
the same level of ﬁnancial impact.
Delta Air Lines COLDSTART
Delta’s COLDSTART ﬂeet assignment application is still
being used on a regular basis and has been upgraded and
enhanced with additional features. The airline is spend-
ing signiﬁcantly on other projects as well as its two
major projects in ﬂeet assignment and revenue manage-
ment, which are being developed with the help of exter-
nal consultants. Delta sees considerable scope for gaining
a competitive advantage in these areas, and believes that
airline companies cannot remain competitive without using
OR tools. Delta plans on “being there” and being com-
petitive in the industry; and this has entailed making sig-
niﬁcant investments in OR. It was suggested to us that
the biggest differentiator between the airlines is who has
the better, more complete, more sensible model and there-
fore Delta is constantly looking for different applications
or improvements.
AT&T Telemarketing Site Selection
The site selection model was used extensively between
1987 and 1997 in support of a “value-added” corporate
strategy at AT&T, but this strategy has now been discarded.
AT&T viewed the model as a vehicle to attract clients as
it attempted to differentiate itself in a commodity business.
The model was used for a few customers at the request
of account teams between 1997 and 1999, with the ﬁnal
U.S. use of the model in 1999 for a major global site
selection application for an international telecommunica-
tions company. A Canadian version of the model was used
by AT&T Canada from 1995 through 2000+ to support a
value-added approach to trying to attract market share in
Canada.
AT&T Call Process Simulator
The original system was viable and in use up until about
1998, when AT&T went away from their value-added strat-
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egy. Basically, the client stopped funding the project, and
since the technology (i.e., the capability of the switches,
the internal software that is used by call centers) required
constant updating, it aged very quickly. The system still
exists, but is not being used much.
ABB Electric
Daniel Elwing, former ABB Electric CEO, was a major
advocate of OR, and the Edelman article reports a number
of projects that appear to have had a major impact. Specif-
ically, customer segmentation work in the electrical trans-
former market, in conjunction with production planning
improvements, enabled ABB to enter a shrinking market
and eventually dominate it by becoming both the low cost
and highest-quality manufacturer. Larry Ritzman, Director
of Market Services and Planning, stated that ABB’s Wauke-
sha plant became the most productive in the world, being
the most vertically integrated, and the highest-volume pro-
ducer at the lowest cycle time. This combination drove
some of ABB Electric’s largest competitors out of the trans-
former market.
ABB Electric’s Waukesha plant was sold to Magna Tech
Inc. in 1990 because of U.S. government concerns that the
parent would control almost 70% of the industry after they
purchased Westinghouse Electric. In 1993, Magna Tech
was in ﬁnancial difﬁculties and was forced to spin off six
companies—one of which was the Waukesha plant. General
Signal purchased the plant and subsequently was acquired
by SPX Corporation. The former ABB Electric transformer
division now operates as Waukesha Electric Systems.
Waukesha is still using the initiatives described in the
Edelman article and has started a best practices transfer of
the production planning processes to other business units
in the transformer market at SPX. Waukesha Electric has
no OR department and employs no OR consultants, but
has instituted a training program for employees through
the American Production and Inventory Control Society
(APICS). Ritzman reports that the company’s involvement
with APICS has been a very effective way of developing
new managers and that achieving the certiﬁcation demon-
strates a sound cross-functional knowledge of how the busi-
ness operates.
Other more generic tools have augmented the original
production planning tools with help from APICS educa-
tional processes. Waukesha Electric has implemented a
continuous improvement process, is launching Six Sigma,
and looking to implement CRM. The company has devel-
oped some internal tools for the sales process and also uses
some packaged software. The move to a multiplant envi-
ronment has caused some difﬁculties because of scalability
problems with the original software.
Ritzman reports that there is strong management sup-
port for their new initiatives, which require the interac-
tion of several disciplines. The outcome is a more focused
organization, a much clearer supervisory work force, and a
work force that understands the systems and what is nec-
essary. Waukesha Electric is focused towards performance
improvement through the economic value-added (EVA)
approach with an emphasis on growth and a compensa-
tion structure that rewards sustained initiatives rather than
short-term results. Dan Elwing (now retired from Wauke-
sha) argues that EVA works towards consistency of results
and steady growth of the company rather than what ABB
used to do, which was to use OR to determine where the
market was and capture maximum efﬁciency.
Waukesha Electric has improved quality departments in
all of their facilities as well as a strong industrial engineer-
ing team. In addition, they have a management-level person
in charge of the continuous improvement process.
Harris Corporation—IMPReSS
Harris (now InterSil) has realized substantial savings and
competitive advantage over the last 10 years from the
IMPReSS production planning system, but it should be
noted that this was a major system reengineering and no
one tool was responsible for all the savings. InterSil still
uses IMPReSS on a daily basis and is totally dependent on
it to run the entire planning system. Since implemention,
they have added new tools and have modiﬁed the system
on an ongoing basis. IMPReSS is seen to be nearing the
end of its useful life and InterSil is looking to replace it or
upgrade it soon.
There was nothing like IMPReSS commercially avail-
able at the time, but the Harris implementation triggered
a signiﬁcant competitor response, and many competitors
now have similar tools, many of which are now seen as an
improvement. InterSil was able to maintain a competitive
advantage for a long time, in part because of their success
in changing the culture of the company to work with this
particular tool: The success of the company in changing
the organizational dynamics paid off signiﬁcantly. InterSil
management recognizes that tools (such as IMPReSS) and
people who can build and maintain these types of tools
are necessary to run the business efﬁciently, and as Inter-
Sil moves to replace IMPReSS, they are looking to hire
more technically competent OR people. We were also told
that demand has increased for consulting services in the
industry, partially because of the Edelman article on Harris
Semiconductor.
National Car Rental
Talus Solutions Inc. (then Aeronomics) partnered with
National Car Rental to develop the revenue management
(RM) application that was the Edelman prize ﬁnalist. This
application is still in use, has been upgraded and main-
tained, and remains a critical part of National’s (now Auto-
nation after mergers with Valu and Alamo) operations.
The dedicated RM group of some 30 business specialists
responsible for executing the RM program is still in exis-
tence and has expanded over time. National has continued
to invest both personnel and monies in this area since 1994.
National also has a small OR department that deals with
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applications such as inventory management or scheduling,
and acts as a support group for RM.
Management recognizes and is very appreciative of RM,
and it has become vital to the culture of National. RM
activities are critical to the ﬁrm’s success and people from
the RM group are involved in all aspects of the business—
ﬁnancial planning, marketing, advertising, ﬂeet acquisi-
tions, and disposals, and have been promoted. Ernest John-
son, formerly VP of RM, is now president of the National
Group. The RM experts have embraced OR and made it a
part of their work culture. This is true throughout the indus-
try. All the major airport car rental companies now practice
revenue management.
The success of the project at National also resulted
in tremendous success for Talus, which was acquired by
supply-chain specialist Manugistics in a deal worth $366
million at signing. (More details of the National application
appear in Bell and Anderson 2001.)
Sadia—PIPA Project
Sadia spent more than U.S. $1 million annually on the PIPA
project (an integrated poultry planning system) for more
than 10 years and the system is still used regularly. The
support and inﬂuence of the vice-president of Agriculture
was fundamental to the early success of PIPA, and when he
left for a new position, PIPA survived because the economic
beneﬁts were already perceived at a corporate level.
There has been some expansion of the scope of PIPA, but
it is no longer a high priority at Sadia, although manage-
ment strongly recognizes the importance of the PIPA sys-
tem. A SAP/ERP project competed for resources with the
PIPA system, resulting in less attention being paid to the
utilization of PIPA. Although the SAP project now com-
mands greater management attention, the PIPA system of
integrated, optimized planning has proven superior to the
administrative connectivity of ERP.
There is still no OR group at Sadia. There is a feeling
that OR techniques work well but are not critical, and tra-
ditional management thinking still dominates. OR has not
become part of the culture of the company, although ideas
from OR developed by consultants are being applied in
logistics and marketing. TQM and ERP are causing a resur-
gence of interest in OR, although the PIPA system predates
the emergence of supply-chain management and advanced
planning and scheduling as important issues.
Southern Company
Several runs of the model are still done every day to deter-
mine unit commitments, and OR optimization techniques
are a critical aspect for remaining competitive in this indus-
try with work similar to Southern’s now standard in the
industry.
Since 1991 the business of the regulated utilities in the
southern United States has changed very dramatically. The
changes in the marketplace are increasingly requiring the
inclusion of bidding, ancillary services (services that ensure
reliability and support the transmission of electricity from
generation sites to customer loads), and ﬁnancial instru-
ments in the models. Most of the OR being done now has
to do with how to integrate the purchase of energy to opti-
mize supply to meet the demand load. OR at Southern is
now integrated into functional groups and studies speciﬁc
problems. Examples include optimizing the purchase of gas
for gas-ﬁred units, or optimizing bids for separate and dis-
tinct markets (i.e., spinning reserve energy) such that, when
combined with existing capacity online, the combination
together minimizes the cost of delivering energy. The opti-
mization problems have become more complicated with the
inclusion of risk management, and Southern is currently
working extensively on the bidding problem with a number
of recent hirings.
It is anticipated that deregulation of the industry will pro-
duce more opportunities to achieve long-term sustainable
competitive advantage through the use of OR.
Vilpac Truck
The initiative reported in the Edelman article was very suc-
cessful and production of trucks went from 8 per day to 42
per day over a three-year period. The company integrated
people across multifunctional teams and there was a cul-
tural shift within the company to an acceptance of OR as an
integral part of the process. The company was so success-
ful in streamlining the business that it was purchased by
Kenworth Truck Company. It is not clear what happened to
the OR work following the acquisition, but it was reported
that the new management team wasn’t comfortable with the
tools employed in the optimization process and went back
to their old way of doing business.
THE FOUR “CONTRIBUTORS”
The interview evidence for the four applications originally
classiﬁed as contributors is summarized in Table 3.
Gas Research Institute
The project appraisal methodology (PAM) continues to be
applied on an annual basis in very much the same way that
it was when the Edelman article was written, with beneﬁts
from the chosen projects for the last ﬁve years estimated at
U.S. $9.6 billion. More resources have been devoted to the
OR group over the last ﬁve years and the majority of the
work is now done in-house. The focus of the group’s work
has shifted towards the business analysis of commercial
ventures because of the deregulation of the energy business
and the resulting loss of national public funding. GRI plans
to use its OR expertise to create an advantage in choosing
technologies that have the greatest chance of commercial
success, and will proﬁt either through partnerships with the
developers or by taking an equity interest in the start-up
companies.
KeyCorp
The service excellence management program is still in exis-
tence at KeyCorp and has been extended several times. The
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Table 3. Summarized ﬁndings for the “Contributor” applications.
OR Has Additional
Improvements Evidence of Other OR Work Become Part Resources
Period on Initial Organizational Competitive As a Result of of Company Devoted to
Application in Use Work Change Response Implementation Culture OR
Gas Research Institute 1978–    
KeyCorp 1991–    
Procter & Gamble 1993–      
Sainsbury 1989–  
project has been very successful; in ﬁve years, approxi-
mately 3,000 staff have been eliminated at an average cost
savings per branch of around $23,000. This result was
obtained while reducing customer wait times and increas-
ing customer satisfaction. KeyCorp has reached the point
where it is almost impossible to go any farther—it requires
at least three people to run a branch and KeyCorp now has
950 Key Centers with fewer than 3,000 employees work-
ing as tellers. Key centers are now doing less than 15% of
the transactions with changes in technology. For example,
one-third of transactions are now done by debit cards, one-
third through ATMs, and 50% of customer inquiries are
now done through 1-800 numbers.
Top management has shown an interest in these initia-
tives because of the increased revenues and reduced costs,
and KeyCorp has experienced numerous inquires into this
program from other banks. Recently, the OR group has
been dismantled and moved over to the strategic analysis
group, where they now are concentrating on data ware-
housing and data mining and are working on credit scoring
mechanisms.
Procter & Gamble
The success of this project led to a renewed focus on OR at
P&G, and resulted in other implementations of this model
for different corporate businesses on a worldwide basis.
To date P&G has done over 30 types of similar analyses
on optimally positioning manufacturing operations. Since
the time of the Edelman article there have been signiﬁcant
resources devoted to OR at P&G, with OR consolidated
into a single group of 12 to 15 people and continuing to
grow. The head of the group remarks that OR’s credibil-
ity is high within the organization at this time and that
the group’s clients are the vice presidents of the company.
OR has been involved in inﬂuencing strategic decisions in
project portfolio management on a very broad basis and has
inﬂuenced key initiatives that the company is considering
undertaking. The Edelman application did lead to a renais-
sance of OR at P&G, and OR is currently heavily involved
in supply-chain management and evaluating e-commerce
opportunities.
Sainsbury
The information systems that were selected for develop-
ment are still operating and are central to the day-to-day
activities of the company. These systems are considered
essential, but Sainsbury is now at the point where they are
considering replacing them with more sophisticated sys-
tems (which may use more mathematics). While the infor-
mation systems have lived up to design parameters, they
have not accomplished as much as some people anticipated,
and this has created a perception that there is room for fur-
ther improvement. Sainsbury has also lost market share.
Sainsbury has not hired OR specialists since this project
and has no internal OR people although it has some statis-
ticians and mathematicians spread through different func-
tional areas. The company is planning to develop a decision
support tool to assist with the next round of IS development
and will be outsourcing OR expertise to help accomplish
its goals in this area.
THE FOURTEEN APPLICATIONS CATEGORIZED
AS HAVING “INSUFFICIENT IMPACT” TO BE
EXAMPLES OF SOR
The interview evidence for the 14 applications orginally
classiﬁed as having insufﬁcient impact to be examples of
SOR is summarized in Table 4.
AT&T Capital Corporation
AT&T Capital vice president Michael DiBernadi used con-
sultants from AT&T Laboratories to develop the 1996
application on credit decision making (Curnow et al. 1997),
credit line management, and delinquent account manage-
ment. AT&T Capital was acquired by Newcourt Credit, and
DiBernadi was able to persuade Newcourt management to
hire the consultants as full-time employees. CIT Group then
acquired Newcourt, and DiBernardi convinced CIT man-
agement to actively support the group. With strong support
at the vice-chairman level, the Edelman system has been
expanded in terms of breadth of deployment, and OR is
now penetrating new areas, including factoring, the con-
sumers’ business, and the equipment-ﬁnancing business.
This is an industry where the use of OR is expanding and
there are good opportunities for future work and future
employment. Tools, such as credit scoring, that were once
considered to be a competitive advantage are now a com-
petitive necessity.
Strong upper management support for the OR work has
been evident and management believes that with the proper
resources, the group will offer a competitive advantage to
the company. If there is a downside, it is the fact that the
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Table 4. Summarized ﬁndings for the applications considered to have had “insufﬁcient inpact” to be examples of SOR.
OR Has Additional
Improvements Evidence of Other OR Work Become Part Resources
Period on Initial Organizational Competitive As a Result of of Company Devoted to
Application in Use Work Change Response Implementation Culture OR
AT&T Capital 1992–     
Bellcore—R&D 1991–97
Bellcore—PDSS 1989–97 
Bellcore—SONET 1992–    
DEC 1989–    
GE Capital 1987–     
GTE Corp. 1987–     
IBM—LMS 1986–    
IBM—OPTIMIZER 1983–??
Kodak 1988–93   
NYNEX 1990–    
Prudential Securities 1988–  
Reynolds 1988–   
Yasuda 1991–   
OR group has not managed to expand beyond ﬁve people,
so the model for the future is to outsource more work and
use the internal people to provide internal guidance. There
has also been some loss of OR identity, with the group now
seen as more of an “analytics” group than an OR group.
Bell Communications Research (Bellcore) (R&D,
PDSS, and SONET)
Bellcore was acquired by Science Applications Interna-
tional Corporation (SAIC) and changed its name to Tel-
cordia Technologies Inc. The Bellcore Consortium R&D
application (Hoadley et al. 1993) died after the consortium
disappeared (and all its consortium-related tools) when
Bellcore was acquired by SAIC. The PDSS decision sup-
port program (Katz et al. 1994) has either disappeared or
its usage is minimal. The SONET Toolkit (Cosares et al.
1995) is still in existence (not currently being marketed)
and has been updated as recently as one year ago, and while
it is not currently in use, it is still state-of-the-art.
After the acquisition, the environment for OR changed
dramatically with the new focus on projects with immedi-
ate results. The members of the OR group were transferred
to other areas and the structure became much more dis-
tributed in terms of the effort and the market that different
business units were trying to reach. Recently a Mathemat-
ical Research Center was formed in Telcordia and this is
beginning to interact with SAIC’s OR group.
Digital Equipment Corporation
Compaq acquired DEC in 1998. The global supply-chain
model (GSCM) (Arntzen et al. 1995) developed by DEC
and Insight Corporation is now marketed by Insight and
currently has about 10 licensees. There have been a number
of enhancements made to the program, with a new design
released in September 2000. Compaq was initially unaware
of the GSCM license that it obtained with the acquisi-
tion, but has since used the software extensively. GSCM
was very beneﬁcial to DEC, but with the onset of ﬁnancial
difﬁculties, the company began downsizing and the group
responsible for GSCM left.
It was reported to us that Compaq’s management believe
that OR modeling applications are a way to gain a compet-
itive advantage in the industry, and they are very supportive
of this type of work.
GE Capital Corporation
The payment initiative (Makuch et al. 1992), which
managed delinquent account collection, was viewed and
protected by GE Capital as providing a strategic advantage.
The program has been modiﬁed many times since imple-
mentation, and the process is now much more highly auto-
mated. The basic philosophy and techniques developed in
the original application are still very much alive today. The
success of this project resulted in funding to the R&D Cen-
ter increasing by approximately 25 times at its peak and the
development of numerous other applications in areas such
as home mortgages, auto loan payments, and leasing debt.
Subsequent to its launch, other large mortgage and col-
lection companies began implementing scoring through-
out their collections process. It is now a requirement in
the industry that any individuals hired to risk-management
positions be familiar with this technology. Although com-
monly known as analytical research, optimization research,
or scoring research, these OR groups are considered critical
to the organization and their opinions are actively sought
on many issues.
GTE Corporation
The merger of GTE Corporation and Bell Atlantic closed
in 2000 to form Verizon Communications. The NETCAP
DSS (Jack et al. 1992) is still in use although it has been
modiﬁed since its initial implementation. GTE Corporation
has no OR department but instead uses OR resources from
GTE Laboratories, which developed the original DSS and
continues to upgrade the algorithms regularly. Since the
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time of the Edelman article, GTE has developed other spe-
ciﬁc initiatives such as IOS Net and AEIS that have used
NETCAP as a foundation.
Recently, GTE has been looking into more automated
planning and forecasting modules for the entire network,
with a strong commitment from management to engage
in this type of research. Many OR professionals from
GTE Laboratories have been promoted to higher levels of
responsibility, and this has led to GTE becoming much
more technologically oriented. Post-merger, the inﬂuence
of OR is being felt in the network and e-commerce areas
especially, since the executives placed in charge of these
areas are from the former GTE and have strong analytical
backgrounds.
IBM (Logistics Management System and
OPTIMIZER)
LMS (Sullivan and Fordyce 1990) continues in daily use
and is one of IBM’s top applications. Some minor exten-
sions were made to the project so that it could run on dif-
ferent platforms, but these were incremental enhancements
only. LMS was designed for the semiconductor division at
Burlington, Vermont, and is now used at other manufactur-
ing sites as well. We could ﬁnd no evidence on the status
of IBM Optimizer (Cohen et al. 1990) and assume that it is
no longer in use. Following LMS, the two authors became
involved in a project called Proﬁt, which is a level up from
LMS and deals with divisionwide supply-chain manage-
ment. Lately, they have been working on another project
called the LMS2000 that enables web-integrated supply-
chain management. This facilitates real-time monitoring of
WIP by customers to show the status of order lots; how-
ever, the stochastic nature of chip, wafer, and module man-
ufacture makes this information difﬁcult to interpret. OR
is being used more often in all processes at IBM and has
become an accepted practice. While there is a central OR
group in the research organization at Yorktown, generally
OR is decentralized at IBM with groups spread throughout
the corporation.
IBM won the 1999 Edelman Award for the Asset Man-
agement Tool (AMT) that measures, analyzes, and guides
the reengineering of IBM’s complex supply chains. Barbara
Martin, vice president of Integrated Supply Chain at IBM,
said that the Edelman award marked an intensive three-year
effort by a core team of 30 people at IBM, and that “our
senior executive management is keenly interested in and
supportive of our work.”
A recent article (Dietrich et al. 2000, p. 52) reviewing
the state of OR at IBM began:
After many years of hard work in the ﬁeld, OR has
become an integral part of IBM’s core. World-class
research in OR and the ability to apply the results to
solve business problems have increased IBM’s com-
petitive edge—IBM’s OR team helped save hundreds
of millions of dollars, while improving operations and
competitive strategies.
Kodak
The Kodak (Australasia) application (Farley 1991) pro-
duced all of the expected gains in productivity and savings
for about ﬁve years. It was also implemented in the Cana-
dian plant, where it was used for about four years until that
plant was closed and production moved to Rochester, NY.
After about ﬁve years the composition of the bulk photo-
graphic paper was changed, eliminating the different blends
and dramatically reducing the need for the model. Although
the application did spawn some initiatives in other product
areas, the employees who worked on this were mostly IT
people without experience in OR, and management did not
distinguish between an IT application and an OR applica-
tion. Over time, the interfaces became fancier, while the
algorithmic content became more heuristic. There appears
to have been at least one instance where an OR simulation
model was used for strategic purposes, but management has
not developed any strong appreciation of OR.
Other initiatives derived from this model in the areas of
graphic arts ﬁlm and x-ray ﬁlm are currently being imple-
mented in Kodak’s operations around the world. Kodak
(Australasia) has never had an OR group and has always
outsourced this type of work; however, the head ofﬁce in
Rochester does have a group with OR skills called the
artiﬁcial intelligence group. Author Farley suspects that
competitors implemented similar work in pursuit of cost
savings.
NYNEX Arachne
NYNEX merged with Bell Atlantic in 1998, and the com-
bined company merged with GTE. The Arachne DSS
(Barnea et al. 1996) is still operational in the New Eng-
land district, but it has been discontinued in New York.
Arachne was ﬁnancially successful in ﬁrst trials, but after
implementation there were no relevant benchmarks to mea-
sure against and this made maintaining funding problem-
atic. The advent of the Internet and the dramatic increase in
new businesses caused the planners to become reactionary
and network planning has been curtailed dramatically. After
the merger with Bell Atlantic, Bell decreased the amount of
money available for research, and when New York stopped
using Arachne, the group was cut from approximately six
people to three people. There have been several spin-off
projects from that initiative, but the resources devoted to
OR did not increase. Randy Pope is the only original author
who is still working with Arachne and he has been doing
some extensions on ring plates and algorithms for SONET.
The new merger with GTE will result in the replacement
of Arachne with the IOS planning tool and any updates
that incorporate SONET planning will likely become part
of IOS.
Prudential Securities
The mortgage valuation models (Ben-Dov et al. 1992) are
still in use and have been reﬁned in-house every year or
so. Since the time of the Edelman article, many OR people
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have left Prudential, and the group is not as big as it used
to be. Furthermore, the Financial Strategies group has been
split into trading and research groups. Currently, Pruden-
tial has a group of three or four people that work on the
model and with other business units on various projects.
They have not extended the model to things like bond arbi-
trage because the intense ﬂuctuations in price make it hard
to justify entering that particular market. The market down-
turn in the 1990s had adverse effects on the size of the ﬁrm
that overshadowed any beneﬁts from the utilization of the
models. Prudential is no longer ranked in the top three of
issuers of collateralized mortgage obligations, and its com-
petitors are now much larger than they are.
Since Prudential implemented these models, all of their
competitors have developed proprietary versions of prepay-
ment models. Competitiveness in this market now requires
the use of these techniques.
Reynolds Metals
Reynolds Metals was acquired by Alcoa in 2000. The cen-
tralized freight operation is still functional and continues
to save cost in the service and freight area. The success of
central dispatch (Moore et al. 1991) resulted in opportuni-
ties to market it outside the ﬁrm, and Reynolds has become
a transportation service provider for other organizations.
Reynolds maintains control of the model and manages the
functionality, only releasing the software that controls the
client interface information to its customers. The consult-
ing group that was involved in the initial development did
most of the reﬁnements to the original model and has an
arrangement whereby it can market the software (but not to
other aluminum companies) if it pays Reynolds royalties.
Nothing major has been added to the model because it was
very robust as originally designed.
At the time of the Edelman article, the OR group was
ﬁve to seven individuals and increased in size until about
1994, and it has remained static since then. This coin-
cides with the departure of upper-level management spon-
sorship when the president and the COO left the company.
Lately there has been a move away from core OR work
towards team facilitation and work in business process
reengineering.
Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co. Ltd.
The asset/liability management model (Cariño et al. 1994)
was used extensively and the company was very happy with
it. The Frank Russell Company, consultants in the devel-
opment of the model, revised the model over the following
three years, but then lost Yasuda as a client. Yasuda had
no employees trained in OR; however, they had employ-
ees with strong backgrounds in actuarial science, ﬁnance,
and IT. Yasuda had a number of in-house groups compris-
ing 40–50 people working on different types of models of
which the Russell–Yasuda model was one key component
in the process. Yasuda increased the funding to these groups
when the initial project was started and remained commit-
ted to that level for the entire duration of the project. A
group of about 20 people remained working on the Russell–
Yasuda model after Russell ﬁnished their contract.
The project champion, K. Sasamoto, was very senior in
the organization and used this project to achieve greater
decision-making authority in the company. Yasuda viewed
this model as a strategic asset and planned to use it as
a foundation to provide them with a sustained advantage
over their competitors. There was a noticeable competitor
response once Yasuda began using this model.
THE FOUR “NONSUSTAINERS”
The interview evidence for the four applications originally
classiﬁed as providing no sustainable advantage is summa-
rized in Table 5.
L.L. Bean
The model for optimizing telemarketing resources (Quinn
et al. 1991) could not be traced and all of the players that
were involved in implementing this model have long since
left the company. The consultant, Bruce Andrews, who
worked on this initiative did work on three other projects
for Bean. The most systematic quantitatively oriented ini-
tiatives that Andrews is aware of happening at L.L. Bean
were TQM and CQI under VP Tom Day. We could not ﬁnd
an employee at Bean who was familiar with the Edelman
initiative; however, some employees reported subsequent
projects of drop-shipping optimization (which is still done
daily) and TQM.
We found no evidence of management support for OR.
Bean does not have a centralized OR group. When Andrews
was there, he brought in some students who functioned as
a very small OR group, but this disappeared when Day left.
Subsequent groups formed that used different types and
levels of analytics in their work—catalogue tracking, cus-
tomer proﬁling, call center forecasting, and capacity plan-
ning scheduling. It is not known if these groups are still in
existence. If L.L. Bean needs any additional support, they
hire consultants.
Merit Brass
In the Edelman article (Flowers 1993), savings at Merit
Brass were estimated at $200,000 annually, but this was
determined by the timing of publication. After implemen-
tation, inventory kept coming down while service levels
on Class A items went from 74% to 98%. Eventually $6
million was eliminated from the $16 million inventory for
a conservative savings of $1 million annually. Immedi-
ately after the implementation, sales started to grow rapidly
(from $32 million annually to $45–50 million). Manage-
ment offers many reasons for the rapid growth, but it
is eminently plausible that customers noted the service
improvements and responded. The cost of the initial OR
work was estimated at $78,000.
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Table 5. Summarized ﬁndings for the four applications considered to be “nonsustainers.”
OR Has Additional
Improvements Evidence of Other OR Work Become Part Resources
Period on Initial Organizational Competitive As a Result of of Company Devoted to
Application in Use Work Change Response Implementation Culture OR
L.L. Bean 1989–??  
Merit Brass 1990–     
Tata Steel 1986–     
Yellow Freight 1988–    
Not surprisingly, Merit called in the consultant to do a
variety of additional projects, including a warehouse “quick
pick” line to assemble 250–350 smaller orders/day. The
original project and others that have followed have changed
the culture of this company. Merit Brass employees are now
“fact-based decision makers.” They don’t always do every-
thing the numbers say, but ﬁrst they “pound the numbers”
so that they know what they say, and then they formu-
late action plans from that point. The Edelman project has
changed Merit Brass and remains a very strong part ot their
culture. We found no evidence of competitors responding
to this work.
Tata Steel
The very successful Edelman-prize-winning project on
optimizing resources at Tata Steel Company (Sinha et al.
1995) has led to OR being used in almost all impor-
tant aspects of management decision making. This includes
business plan formulation and monitoring performance
against that plan, constrained resource distribution, make-
or-buy decisions, calculating break-even prices, and short
or immediate decisions that can be optimized.
The model from the Edelman article is not very relevant
anymore because Tata Steel has gone from a power short-
age to a power surplus, but the model has been used on
occasion to manage the surplus situation.
The OR department at Tata Steel was four individuals at
the time of the Edelman article and has now expanded to
25 people in four groups: a planning and optimizing group,
a data management group, a cost management research
group, and an analytics group. Despite the general trend
towards downsizing in the rest of the company, the OR
department has been allowed to expand at will, provid-
ing they ﬁnd the appropriate individuals. Gopal Sinha, the
leader of the OR group at that particular time, has been
promoted to deputy general manager. The culture of the
company has changed towards an acceptance of OR tech-
niques. Recently, Tata Steel won a gold medal for the most
cost-effective steel plant in India.
Tata’s CEO originally was not convinced that the com-
pany needed an OR group, but after the success of the
Edelman initiative he became a strong supporter, and senior
management are now completely convinced of the impor-
tance of OR techniques. This has led to the entrusting of
many other initiatives to the OR group.
Tata Steel has not noticed signiﬁcant competitive reac-
tion to their OR initiatives. Sinha attributes this to the weak
economic situation for steel plants in India during the eco-
nomic recession of the last two years. Tata Steel was in
economic surplus despite the recession—they see this as a
direct result of their optimized decision making.
Yellow Freight System, Inc.
Yellow Freight’s load-planning model, SYSNET (Braklow
et al. 1992) is still in use although it has evolved a gen-
eration. The original model has been extended to real-time
analysis to control line haul operations, and forecasting
tools have been added. It is an integral tool within the
organization and is used to plan the network and termi-
nal structures. Any new initiatives must be reviewed within
SYSNET, and any structure issues or strategic planning
decisions are tested within the model. Yellow has used
SYSNET as a foundation to build the existing system and
stay ahead of the competition. There has been more recog-
nition of the OR department and more interest in investing
in these areas from upper management. This has been a
slow evolutionary process and has led to other models that
are used in the tactical day-to-day operations being installed
in the last couple of years. As well, there has been a grad-
ual increase in the decision-making authority of the OR
department. Yellow has employed consultants in the past
to handle the construction of systems for complex problem
solving; however, they intend to run their operation more
in-house in the future and have recently hired more people
with OR degrees.
DISCUSSION
The longevity of these applications is impressive: 26 of the
34 applications are still in use. The great majority of the
survivors (23 of 26) have been developed and improved
since the Edelman competition. An objective of the Edel-
man competition is to promote the use and development of
OR, and these applications appear to have done that within
their corporations: 24 of 34 have catalyzed other OR work
for their developers, 14 have lead to additional resources
being devoted to OR, and in 18 cases we found evidence
that OR is now a widely accepted part of the corporate
culture. Perhaps surprisingly, we found evidence that 20
applications had attracted the attention of competitors and
triggered some form of competitive response, usually an
attempt to replicate the work.
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The evidence from the years following the Edelman
competition on the fate of the 12 applications originally
classiﬁed as examples of “strategic OR” strongly sup-
ports the view that these applications created a competitive
advantage for their ﬁrms for an extended period of time.
Three of the applications are no longer in use: Both AT&T
applications were in use for at least 10 years before a major
change in AT&T’s corporate strategy rendered them obso-
lete (one of these is still in use in AT&T Canada), and the
Vilpac application appears to have been set aside when the
ownership of the ﬁrm changed. Here, as well as in the case
of ABB Electric/Waukesha, which has also gone through
changes of ownership, the OR work contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to creating the rosy ﬁnancial situation that made an
acquisition possible.
AA arrival-slot allocation has not been as visible as
the AA yield management and crew-pairing applications,
although all three applications are now actively marketed
by Sabre Decision Technologies, the successor of the AA
OR group. The OR group at AA, known as AA Deci-
sion Technologies and then Sabre Decision Technologies,
before being spun out as Sabre Technology Solutions, was
extensively involved in AA operations and decision making
throughout this period, and provides the strongest evidence
of being a strategic OR group with a portfolio of applica-
tions that included the three Edelman ﬁnalists.
The post-Edelman evidence on the Gas Research Insti-
tute, KeyCorp, and Sainsbury applications strongly sug-
gests that these were correctly classiﬁed as “contributors.”
These ﬁrms do not identify the very substantial beneﬁts
attained with the use of OR, and have not made the level of
investment in OR that would be commensurate with these
levels of beneﬁts.
The development of OR at P&G since 1996 suggests
that this application may have been incorrectly classiﬁed
and now appears to ﬁt the deﬁnition of SOR. In the origi-
nal Edelman literature, this work appeared to be a one-time
reengineering project and hence did not meet the deﬁni-
tion of “SOR work” but, in the last ﬁve years, P&G has
used this same OR-model-based methodology more than
30 times to reengineer other supply chains. The OR work
has, therefore, been used over a period of time, has been
maintained and updated, has precipitated a variety of orga-
nizational change, and has created signiﬁcant beneﬁts for
P&G. It has also led to signiﬁcant investment in an OR
group that now appears to be on its way to becoming a
strategic OR group.
The new evidence on the fate of the 14 applications
originally classiﬁed as having “insufﬁcient impact” to be
examples of SOR provides no strong reasons to change
the earlier assessment of the majority of these applications:
AT&T Capital, Bellcore (R&D, PDSS, and SONET), DEC,
GTE, IBM Optimizer, Kodak, NYNEX, and Reynolds.
While several of these applications continue to be used fre-
quently, none appears to have attracted the level of both
internal and external attention that would be expected for
an example of SOR.
The new evidence suggests that four of the “insufﬁcient
impact” applications, GE Capital, Prudential, Yasuda Fire
and Marine, and IBM LMS were more “strategic” than
originally thought. These models appear to have garnered
senior management support over a substantial period of
time, and triggered a strong competitive response that has
led to wide-scale adoption of similar models in their indus-
tries. The LMS model at IBM provided the foundation for
later supply-chain OR applications that have been impres-
sive (Dietrich et al. 2000) and ﬁt the deﬁnition of SOR.
The history of the four “nonsustainers” contained some
surprises. The new data on the L.L.Bean application is con-
sistent with its classiﬁcation as a “nonsustainer:” We found
no sign of either this application or OR being nurtured
over a period of time at L.L.Bean. However, the new evi-
dence on the Merit Brass, Tata Steel, and Yellow Freight
applications suggests that these applications are more cor-
rectly classiﬁed as examples of SOR. The OR work in
these applications does not appear to be particularly com-
plex or proprietary, and we therefore assumed that if this
work had a competitive impact it would be easily repli-
cated and the impact nulliﬁed. This appears to be the case
at Yellow Freight, with the use of OR models similar to the
load-planning model now a mainstay of the freight industry.
At Merit Brass and Tata Steel, the OR work does appear
to have provided a signiﬁcant competitive beneﬁt; Merit
Brass’ sales have grown by 50%, Tata Steel won a gold
medal for having the most cost-effective steel plant in India.
However, competitors do not appear to have responded by
replicating the work.
The longitudinal data adds to our understanding of the
competitive response to SOR. Several of these applications
have prompted competitors to replicate the successful OR
application and have produced a situation where OR has
become a competitive necessity rather than a competitive
advantage: In strategic terms, the OR work is now a core
competence. For example, ﬁrms in the airline and rental
car industries cannot be competitive without yield manage-
ment systems. When OR, or a particular application of OR,
is a core competence, creation of a sustainable advantage
for one ﬁrm requires that that ﬁrm’s OR be leading edge.
This requires that one ﬁrm consistently be further down the
“learning curve” than the competition; that is, the ﬁrm has
developed its databases, algorithms, and technologies to be
continually ahead of the competition. The best example of
this would appear to be Sabre, with yield management from
the early days (1985) almost to the present day.
The data show that Merit Brass has sustained a major
competitive advantage for more than 10 years from some
OR work that originally cost less than $100,000 to under-
take, and which has been widely publicized. A competi-
tor observing slipping market share or proﬁtability that
attributes this to a cost disadvantage, such as could be cre-
ated by SOR work, has several ways to respond. While
OR professionals might see replicating the OR work as
an obvious response, it is not at all clear that the busi-
ness world is familiar enough with OR to do this. Few
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Table 6. Reclassiﬁcation of the 34 corporate Edelman applications 1990–1997 after the follow-up study.
SOR Contributors Insufﬁcient Impact Nonsustainers
AA yield management
AA ASAS
AA TRIP
ABB Electric
AT&T call simulator
AT&T TM site selection
Delta COLDSTART
GE Capital
Harris Corporation
IBM LMS
National Car Rental
Merit Brass
Procter & Gamble
Prudential Securities
Sadia
Southern Company
Tata Steel
Vilpac Truck
Yasuda
Yellow Freight
(20)
Gas Research Institute
KeyCorp
Sainsbury
(3)
AT&T Capital Corp.
Bellcore SONET
Bellcore PDSS
Bellcore R&D
DEC
GTE
IBM Optimizer
Kodak
NYNEX
Reynolds
(10)
L.L. Bean
(1)
"strategic consultants" would propose responding to a cost
disadvantage by setting up an OR group and trying to repli-
cate the SOR work that is causing the competitive distress.
A more likely strategic response would be some form of
niche strategy that avoids competing head-to-head with the
cost-advantaged ﬁrm.
In Table 6, we summarize our assessment of the 34 appli-
cations following analysis of the longitudinal data.
CONCLUSIONS
A comparison of the original classiﬁcation (Table 1) and
the revised classiﬁcation following analysis of ﬁve or more
years of post-Edelman competition data leads to some inter-
esting conclusions about the long-term impact of OR
Some ﬁrms use OR in an incremental fashion to tackle
very large, complex problems yielding improved compet-
itive positions over long periods of time, as has been the
case of American Airlines/Sabre with yield management.
Other ﬁrms tackle a number of smaller operational level
problems on an ongoing basis, much like Merit Brass,
where these improvements incrementally make the organi-
zation more attractive. These two approaches both appear
to be successful over the long term.
Central to the continued success of any OR effort is
an acceptance by management and/or belief in a rigorous
approach to decision making. It is clear from those orga-
nizations where OR did not become “strategic” following
the success evident at the time of the Edelman competition,
that quantitative rigor in decision making was not taken to
heart nor accepted or deemed valuable by senior manage-
ment. The reclassiﬁcation of such organizations as Proc-
ter & Gamble, Merit Brass, and Tata Steel as examples of
SOR indicates how a continued management commitment
to OR methods can extend what would otherwise appear
as transferable, easily replicated, or low impact OR into a
long-term competitive advantage.
Additionally, organizations evolve and innovations are
often quickly adopted. Systems that once provided a com-
petitive advantage can quickly become a competitive neces-
sity. Sustaining an advantage from OR efforts may require
the continual extension of original solutions to more inno-
vative approaches with increased scope. A particular chal-
lenge is maintaining the currency of OR solutions as busi-
ness models change or as organizations themselves change
(perhaps through merger activity).
Our ﬁndings provide evidence that OR can contribute to
organizational success through creating advantage that can
be sustained. This can occur even though the OR work is
not complex by the standards of OR people, but rather that
the OR work is accepted by management and utilized to
implement change (either organizational or process). Incre-
mental gains achieved by continuously improving solutions
to large-scale projects or a portfolio of successful smaller
projects can both lead to expansion and growth for OR
(potentially across other business units).
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